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No. 84362-7
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Defendant/Appellant,
v.
MATHEW and STEPHANIE McCLEARY et al.,
Plaintiffs/Respondents.
MOTION FOR LIMITED INTERVENTION AND MOTION TO RECUSE
BY STATE LEGISLATORS
Andrew R. Stokesbary, WSBA No. 46097
Stokesbary PLLC
1003 Main Street, Suite 5
Sumner, WA 98390
Telephone (206) 486-0795
Email: dstokesbary@stokesbarypllc.com
Attorney for Proposed Intervenors

I.

Introduction
Movants are legislators who desire fair and unbiased judges to

decide this important case. They seek to intervene for the limited purpose
of asking for the recusal of Justice Mary Yu. They do so because while this
case was pending and being briefed, Justice Yu delivered a speech to WEAPAC, the political action committee of the Washington Education
Association (“WEA”), a member of the Network for Excellence in

Washington Schools, one of the plaintiff-respondents. “Where a judge’s
decisions are tainted by even a mere suspicion of partiality, the effect on the
confidence can be debilitating.” In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Sanders, 145 P. 3d 1208, 1212 (Wash. 2006).
II.

Name and designation of movants
Movants are Representatives Matt Manweller, David Taylor, Joe

Schmick, Mary Dye, Mike Volz, Brandon Vick, Jacquelin Maycumber and
Cary Condotta and Senators Michael Baumgartner and Doug Erickson.
Movants have a substantial stake in the outcome of this case. They
are among the legislators who have negotiated and passed state budgets
since this case was filed that have dramatically increased K-12 education
funding. See generally 2018 Report to the Washington State Supreme Court
by the Joint Select Committee on Article IX Litigation, April 3, 2018 (filed
April 9, 2018). Combined, they represent more than one million
Washingtonians whose lives, schools, and pocketbooks are all deeply
affected by this case.
Movants also have a personal stake in this matter. The State has been
held in contempt and fined while this case has been pending. During the
pendency of the case, the litigants themselves, and even the Court at times,
have discussed certain degrees of personal liability for legislators, including
withholding salaries and other financial sanctions, until this case is resolved.
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Movants make no secret of their support for an amply-funded
program of basic education as a policy matter. Each endeavors to support
only legislation which meets the burden of constitutionality. Of course, the
Court is entitled to its judicial review of questions of constitutionality, and
movants recognize that they will sometimes reach a different conclusion
than the Court. Yet movants, as inherently political actors elected by voters
to pursue articulated policy goals (as opposed to members of the Court, who
are elected to interpret and apply legal standards to questions of facts and
law1), have a special interest in ensuring that such judicial review is both
actually unbiased and appears to the public as unbiased.
III.

Relief sought
Movants seek to intervene for the limited purpose of moving to

recuse Justice Mary Yu. Due to the serious issues raised, movants also
request oral argument on this motion.
IV.

Parts of the record relevant to the motion
The record relevant to the motion to intervene consists of the elected

positions as state legislators held by movants and their roles crafting the
legislation now under consideration by the Court.

1

See Code Jud. Conduct 4.1, cmt. 1 (“Even when subject to public election, a judge plays
a role different from that of a legislator or executive branch official. Rather than making
decisions based upon the expressed views or preferences of the electorate, a judge makes
decisions based upon the law and the facts of every case.”)
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The record relevant to the motion to recuse is publicly available. The
WEA is a party to this case as one of the plaintiffs, the Network for
Excellence in Washington Schools, includes the WEA as a member. See
https://waschoolexcellence.org/about/news-members/.
On Saturday, April 21, WEA-PAC, the political action committee
of the WEA, held a conference in Spokane. See Washington Supreme Court
Justice Criticized for Speech to Powerful Teachers Union, Walker
Orenstein, Tacoma News Tribune, Apr. 26, 2018, available at
http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article209855729.html
(“Orenstein Article”). Here is a picture from the event, with closed
captioning explaining the crowd’s reaction and a social media comment
from the official twitter account of the Tacoma Education Association:
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Here is a sampling of additional posts about the speech made to
social media website by WEA members in attendance:

Justice Yu and the WEA declined to provide a video or audio
recording of the speech to the news media. Orenstein Article. According to
Justice Yu, “[t]here was no question I had an agenda and that was I want
(teachers) to invite judges into the classroom.” Id. A spokesman for the
WEA claimed she also spoke about “her path to becoming a Supreme Court
Justice and the role that education played in her life.” Id. Neither Justice Yu
nor the spokesman provided any additional information about how long
Justice Yu stayed at the event, whom she spoke with, or what they talked
about. Yet posts made to social media websites by attendees indicate that
Justice Yu met personally with WEA members. Here are a few such posts:
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V.

Argument
1.

Motion to intervene for a limited purpose

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in
an action . . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the
person is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicants interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
CR 24(a)(2); see generally Westerman v. Cary, 892 P.2d 1067, 1088 (Wash.
1994). There is no question movants have timely applied for intervention;
this motion is filed two weeks after the events that require recusal.
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The other factors favor limited intervention as well. Movants each
have a compelling interest in the proper resolution of this case. They
negotiated and passed budgets that have provided dramatic increases in K12 funding, and some of them were among the principal negotiators of those
budgets. Even more than that, each movant is a member of an institution
that has been held in contempt and been fined in this case, and each face the
prospect of seeing their salaries withheld or other personal financial
sanctions. Each deserves a fair tribunal to decide the constitutionality of the
Legislature’s work.
Moreover, as a practical matter, the resolution of this case without
movants’ intervention may impair and impede their ability to protect their
interests, and no current party will adequately represent those interests.
Movants are reliably informed that no current party to this matter will seek
recusal. Movants deserve the opportunity to argue for recusal before their
interests in the matter are decided.
2.

Movants have standing

To the extent the Court may have questions about movants’
standing, separate from the merits of their motion to intervene, the answer
is that they do. “The basic test for standing is whether the interest sought to
be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
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question.” Seattle v. State, 694 P. 2d 641, 668 (Wash. 1985) (citation
omitted). Moreover, “[w]here a controversy is of serious public importance
the requirements for standing are applied more liberally.” Id.
Movants have standing in two primary ways. First, and most
concretely, the outcome of this case could affect their salaries. The litigants,
and the Court itself at oral argument, have considered whether individual
legislators should have their pay reduced or deferred until this case is
resolved. See State ex rel. O’Connell v. Dubuque, 413 P. 2d 972, 976 (Wash.
1966) (granting standing on whether legislators who voted for pay raises
could run for re-election; “[q]uestions of salary, tenure, and eligibility to
stand for public office, all being matters directly affecting the freedom of
choice in the election process are of as much moment to the voters as they
are to the candidates, and make this controversy one of public importance”).
Movants deserve a fair panel to decide issues directly affecting their wages.
Second, movants are members of an institution which the
constitution invests with the sole authority, subject only to gubernatorial
veto, to write state budgets. See generally Legislature v. Lowry, 931 P.2d
885 (Wash. 1997). The final resolution of this case before this Court is a
critical step in restoring legislative authority over the state budget. Movants
have standing to ensure that any decision about such a resolution is made
by an unbiased panel of judges.
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3.

Motion to recuse

Under a number of canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“CJC”),
Justice Yu’s actions require recusal in this case. The fundamental,
overarching rule is that “[a] judge shall act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality
of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety.” CJC 1.2. While Justice Yu defended her speech to a party in
this case by noting that “she attends public events between 10 and 15 times
a month, and that any one of those could be interpreted as political,”
Orenstein Article, the canons impose a higher standard on judges than other
elected officials—“[a] judge should expect to be the subject of public
scrutiny that might be viewed as burdensome if applied to other citizens,
and must accept the restrictions imposed by the Code.” CJC 1.2 cmt. 2. The
purpose of that rule, and the primary reason movants are seeking recusal,
the enduring need for an independent and trusted judiciary in our tripartite
form of government—as comment 3 to CJC Rule 1.2 explains, “[c]onduct
that compromises the independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge
undermines public confidence in the judiciary.”
Justice Yu also violated a number of rules of Canon 2 of the CJC,
that “a judge should perform the duties of judicial office impartially,
competently, and diligently.”
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•

Under CJC Rule 2.1, the “duties of judicial office, as prescribed
by law, shall take precedence over all of a judge’s personal and
extrajudicial activities.”

•

Under CJC Rule 2.2, a “judge shall uphold and apply the law,
and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and
impartially.”

•

Under CJC Rule 2.4(B) and (C), a judge shall not
“permit . . . political . . . or other interests or relationships to
influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment” or “convey
or authorize others to convey the impression that any person or
organization is in a position to influence the judge.”

•

Under CJC Rule 2.9(A), a “judge shall not initiate, permit, or
consider ex parte communications . . . concerning a pending or
impending matter[.]”

•

Under CJC Rule 2.10(A), a “judge shall not make any public
statement that would reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending
in any court[.]”

As for extrajudicial political activities in particular, Canon 4 CJC
spells out specific restrictions for judges in their capacity as political
candidates, but Justice Yu’s conduct does not find a safe harbor in these
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rules. Most importantly, a judge may not “make any statement that would
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a
matter pending or impending in any court,” CJC 4.1(A)(11), and must “[a]ct
at all times in a manner consistent with the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary,” CJC 4.2(A)(1). Those rules exist because
“[e]ven when subject to public election, a judge plays a role different from
that of a legislator or executive branch official. Rather than making
decisions based upon the expressed views or preferences of the electorate,
a judge makes decisions based upon the law and the facts of every case.”
CJC 4.1 cmt. 1. Compare with Justice Yu’s Comments to news media,
Orenstein Article (“Yu also said she attends public events between 10 and
15 times a month, and that any one of those could be interpreted as
political.”).
To be sure, CJC Rule 3.7 allows judges to speak at meetings of
organizations, but only subject to CJC Rule 3.1, which prohibits a judge
from “participating in activities that would undermine the judge’s
independence, integrity, or impartiality,” which has unfortunately occurred
in this instance.
The CJC is also quite clear that a “judge shall disqualify himself or
herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned[.]” CJC 2.11. Actual impartiality is not necessary, for when
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a “judge’s decisions are tainted by even a mere suspicion of partiality, the
effect on the public’s confidence in our judicial system can be debilitating.”
Sherman v. State, 905 P.2d 355, 378 (Wash. 1995). Indeed, when it comes
to ex parte communications, even “inadvertently obtain[ing] information
critical to a central issue” requires recusal. Id. at 379.
The most relevantly similar case is In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Sanders, 145 P.3d 1208 (Wash. 2006). There, Justice Sanders
visited a facility for sexually violent predators while a case pending at the
Court involving the sexually violent predator law. Justice Sanders spoke
with the residents, knowing that the issues they discussed might have
bearing on the case before the Court. He was admonished by the
Commission on Judicial Conduct, which this Court (with nine Court of
Appeals’ Judges presiding) affirmed: the “Commission justifiably found
that Justice Sanders, with full awareness of the potential for situations that
could conflict with the Code of Judicial Conduct, embarked on the tour and
met with litigants who had pending cases before the court.” Id. at 1211. He
“created a situation that clearly violated both the letter and the spirit of the
canons and created serious concern for both counsel and fellow jurists about
the appearance of partiality.” Id.
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Perhaps most notably, the question in Sanders was whether to
uphold an admonishment; Justice Sanders himself saw the clear violation
and voluntarily recused himself in the case. Id. at 1212, n.11.
Recusal is similarly required here. Justice Yu both spoke at the
annual political event of one of the plaintiffs here and spent time with
individual members of the organization. No recording has been publicly
disclosed, and what facts have been made available creates far more than
the “mere suspicion of partiality” that required recusal in Sherman.2
It is hard to square Justice Yu’s claim that she only discussed her
journey to becoming a judge and encouraged teachers to invite judges to
classrooms with the fawning social media posts from attendees. Conversely,
it is easy to understand why the movants, the general public, and other
parties in this case might take Justice Yu’s assertion with a heavy dose of
skepticism. Indeed this dichotomy illustrates why recusal is necessary—
even if the speech itself were entirely innocuous, the discussions Justice Yu
had with attendees before and after the speech raise the suspicion of
improper communications. Justice Yu has thus, at minimum, created the
appearance of impropriety. If Justice Yu fails to recuse, “the effect on the

2

Sanders arose from the appeal of a decision by the Commission on Judicial Conduct
following a complaint at that body, which conducted a fact-finding hearing. There may
well be a similar complaint filed with respect to this situation, but even with only the facts
currently known, recusal is required.
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public’s confidence in our judicial system can be debilitating.” Sherman,
905 P.2d at 378.
Recusal is the only method available to ensure the public and the
parties that this case will be decided fairly by an impartial panel.
VI.

Conclusion
It is the sincere hope of movants that Justice Yu makes the same

decision that Justice Sanders made and moots this motion by voluntarily
recusing herself in this case. But if she does not, movants request that they
be permitted to intervene, and, respectfully, request that she be recused.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 8th day of May, 2018.
Stokesbary PLLC
/s/ Andrew R. Stokesbary
Andrew R. Stokesbary, WSBA No. 46097
Attorney for Movants
Representative Matt Manweller
Representative David Taylor
Representative Joe Schmick
Representative Mary Dye
Representative Mike Volz
Representative Brandon Vick
Representative Jacquelin Maycumber
Representative Cary Condotta
Senator Michael Baumgartner
Senator Doug Erickson
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